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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is, first to briefly review the different aspects of 
the brain drain, its potential positive or negative, direct or indirect effects 
on the economy of the home country; second, to highlight the limited 
empirical research on some of these issues, and third, to discuss the 
empirical evidence on the nature and size of the brain drain, as well as its 
impact on the economy of Albania, Bulgaria and Greece, The ultimate aim is 
to try answering the question whether the actual brain drain experienced by 
these countries has been or can be a threat to their development. 
 
2. Debate on Brain Drain, Brain gain and Brain Waste 
 
The traditional view on brain drain stresses only the negative effects, which 
accompany the departure of highly educated persons from developing 
countries. Apart from loss of valuable human capital, other potential losses 
in this respect refer to the shrinkage or elimination of externalities that the 
employment of highly educated creates in the home country. Such deprived 
externalities for the home country include the loss in productivity of other 
persons working with the highly educated, the loss from the employment of 
the departed workers in education and health and more generally, their 
influence in social policies and institutions (Ozden and Schiff, 2006). 
According to Lucas (2004), the lost externalities in education from brain 
drain although theoretically discussed (e.g. World Bank 2000: 39), 
pinpointing the actual presence of such externalities and their 
quantification is not an easy task. This is an old issue on which the literature 
is ambivalent. 
 
The view that the home country bears the cost of education and the host 
country enjoys the benefits of the generated human capital is not entirely 
true. Evidence shows that the cost of the investment in human capital is not 
fully borne by the home country. For instance, in 1993, about 60 percent of 
US foreign-born college graduates obtained their highest degree from a US 
university. Only 13 per cent earned their post-graduate degree outside the 
US. (Lucas, 2004:22). Moreover, these assumed or actual losses from brain 
drain are partly or wholly counterbalanced by a diffusion of benefits 
stemming from the emigration of educated people and their success in the 
host country. 
 
The recent “new brain drain literature” discusses the brain gain coming 
either from the presence of educated migrants in the host country, such as 
the promotion of trade, capital flows and technology transfers, or from their 
absence from the home country, when they are successful abroad, and 
motivate more higher education in the home country, with the hope or 
expectation that the newly educated will have the possibility to emigrate 
and work successfully in another country (Lucas, 2004). The “new brain 
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drain literature” deals with the brain drain induced brain gain, which may 
even result in a net brain gain that raises welfare and growth in the home 
country (Schiff and Ozden, 2006:202). 
 
A number of mostly theoretical, but also some empirical studies belong to 
this “new brain drain approach” Among them, one may list Stark, 
Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998); Mountford (1997); Carrington and 
Detragiache (1998,1999); Vidal (1998); Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 
2003); Stark (2002, 2004); Stark and Wang (2002); Adams (2003); Stark et al 
(2004); Lucas (2004, 2005), Docquier and Marfouk (2004); and Dumont and 
Lemaitre (2005) [Most of these items are cited in Ozden and Schiff (eds), 
2006]. 
 
More analytically, emigration may increase if the difference in the return to 
education abroad and at home is positive, which would subsequently 
generate higher expected returns on human capital, raising enrolments in 
higher education (Stark, 2002). Normally, emigration may only absorb part 
of the new graduates, while the rest will stay home increasing the domestic 
human capital. Stark shows that the induced more investment in individual 
human capital would generate more welfare benefits to the whole society. 
He concludes by saying that migration is “a harbinger of human capital gain, 
not [a] culprit of human capital drain”, and he continues “even those who 
cannot gain from migration by participating in it stand to gain from the 
response of others”. With some reservation for bad quality data of a cross-
section of 37 developing countries, Beine et al. (2001) found a positive and 
significant effect of migration prospects on human capital formation. 
Carrington and Detragiache,(1999), computing emigration rates by 
educational level for a large group of 50 developing countries found similar 
results.  
 
In a more recent more refined paper, Beine et al (2003), using similar cross-
section data, found a difference in the impact on human capital depending 
on the relative size of the emigrated highly qualified persons and the size of 
human capital in the home country. Countries with low levels of both are 
positively responding to brain drain, whereas in countries with migration 
rates of highly educated over 20 per cent, and/or the share of highly 
educated in the population over 5 per cent, brain drain has a negative 
impact on growth. In this case, it is interesting that among losers and 
winners, the winners are found in the demographically larger countries, 
which make up 80 per cent of the population sample. The authors conclude 
from this analysis that there is a lack of aggregate empirical substantiation 
that rich countries steal the highly educated from the poor countries.  
 
A more holistic approach to the brain drain- brain gain issue that captures 
both negative and positive effects from the emigration of highly educated 
persons goes through a general equilibrium analysis. The proponents of this 
approach move one step further from the view that brain drain sends more 
people to higher education, maintaining that if there is an “induced” turn to 
more education, more funds will be drawn from the state budget - given 
that high education is mostly public - depriving other public services, such 
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as health, of finance and/or leading to the imposition of more taxes. At the 
same time, greater enrolments in higher education would bring less tax 
revenue that may also eventually lead to higher taxes, reducing disposal 
income and holding back the demand for higher education, which may end 
up with a smaller brain gain (Schiff, 2006:212).  
 
This approach misses, in my view, one important point. It leaves out of the 
general equilibrium analysis one significant variable, i.e. the often huge 
amount of remittances that flow into the home country. To mention only 
one case, remittances of Albanian migrants represented in the 1990’s 15-20 
per cent of the country’s GDP (IMF, 1997, cited in Kule et al, 2002). This 
money raises the disposal income of recipients and their subsequent demand 
for various goods, most notably education (Glytsos, 1993; 2001; Docquier 
and Marfouk, 2006). The induced demand of migrant families generates 
additional “feedback effects” and contributes to further growth and 
employment. Other counterbalancing “feedback effects” stem from the 
return migration equipped with skills and technological knowledge gained 
abroad that would contribute to growth of the home economy (Docquier and 
Marfouk, 2006). 
 
Apart from any positive or negative effects, as above for the home country, 
there may be a brain waste involved when educated migrants very often do 
jobs in host countries for which they are overqualified. The quality of 
education that the migrants carry with them from the home country plays 
an important role in the easiness or difficulty of finding suitable jobs in the 
host country. More problems face immigrants from Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and Middle Eastern countries (Ozden, 2006, p.227). Migrants coming 
from countries where English is predominant and from countries with high 
expenditures in tertiary education fare better in the US labour market (ibid: 
241). More concrete empirical evidence on brain waste for the countries of 
our interest here is presented in the 4th section of the paper.  
 
3. Empirical Evidence on the Size and Significance of Highly Qualified 
Immigrants from the perspective of Host Countries 
 
This section discusses the empirical evidence on brain drain and brain gain 
or waste from the perspective of the major immigrant countries, i. e. US, 
and Europe with inflows from the rest of the world. Straubhaar (2000:13) 
discerns “a brain gain for the US, a brain drain for Eastern Europe and a 
brain exchange in the European Union”. Survey data show that 42 percent of 
all foreign born adults in the US hold a college degree and 23 per cent of 
them possess post-graduate qualifications. It is interesting for our purposes 
here that 90 per cent of these educated persons were born in low income 
regions or in transition economies, including Eastern Europe (Lucas, 2004: 
15). Out of 1.4 million immigrants in the USA from Eastern Europe, 39 per 
cent have college degrees and 16 per cent post-graduate degrees. More 
particularly, out of the 26,000 Albanian immigrants, 38 per cent hold a 
college degree (Table 1). 
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Table 1. US Foreign Born (Eastern Europe) Adult Population by Country of 
Birth and Level of Education, in 2000 
 
                    Primary     Secondary       College      Post-Graduate     Total 
Eastern Eur    132,805      478,142         532,425           223,561     1,366,933 
Albania             3,540        12,400            9,845                                 25,785 
Croatia             6,725         14,350          14,380                                35,455 
Poland            48,764       159,356        141,348             47,016        396,484 
Russia             22,735         72,544        130,756             73,319        299,354 
Other              51,041       219,492        236,096           103,226        609,855 
 
Source Adapted from Adams (2003), derived from US Current Population 
Survey 2000 (Lucas, 2004: 16). 
 
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of skilled migrants in OECD countries 
has increased 2.5 times more than the number of unskilled migrants (70per 
cent versus 28 per cent) (Docquier and Rapoport, 2004). The portion of 
migrants with tertiary education is low from Latin American countries, over 
50% for Middle East and some African countries, slightly lower than 50 per 
cent for Eastern European countries and around 40 per cent for Asia. 
(Ozden, 2006). However, out of the 8,578 Bulgarians admitted for 
permanent residence in the US, during the period 1996-1998, only 28 per 
cent were highly educated (Gachter, 2002). 
 
An important vehicle through which highly qualified persons are channelled, 
at least in the US, are the US higher education institutions. About 32 per 
cent of all foreign students in OECD countries are studying in the US, while 
25 per cent of H1B temporary visa holders have graduated from US 
universities (OECD Observer, 2002). Evidence shows that about half of the 
European students obtaining doctoral degrees from American Universities 
stay there for work after graduation, many of them never returning home 
(Mahroum 1999:20). More concretely, about 51 per cent earning doctorate 
degrees in science and engineering from US universities, during the period 
1994-1995, four-five years later (in 1999) were working in the US (Finn 2001, 
cited by Lucas, 2004:23). Another study for eight countries has 
demonstrated that "scientists and engineers are on the average ten times as 
likely to emigrate to the United States as are people from other 
occupations"(Grubel and Scott, 1977:80).  
One thing that must be emphasised in this context is that brain drain does 
not concern only developing but also European Developed countries as well. 
A recent study by the European Commission, titled "Brain drain study - 
emigration flows for qualified scientists" shows that 71 per cent of EU 15 
born students earning doctoral degrees from US Universities, during the 
period 1991-2000, had no plans of returning to Europe, and the number is 
rising (News Alert, 25.11.2003). This is mainly due to Europe’s relative 
deficiency in research and development compared to the US. To satisfy the 
EU objective of increasing, by 2010, research spending to 3 per cent of its 
budget would require an additional 700,000 new researchers.  
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This means that if such a plan is going to be implemented there would be a 
great demand for scientists within EU15 and a strong motivation of CEEC 
new members’ brains to move in. In fact, this is already taking place. The 
German government scheme, in 2000, to recruit 20,000 foreign IT workers 
was considerably implemented in  about one year’s time, during which 
Germany managed to get about half of this targeted number mainly from 
Eastern European countries (OECD Observer, 2002). 
The presence of this shortage of highly qualified persons in Europe and the 
accompanied policies for filling the gap by adopting schemes and 
facilitations for labour mobility within EU create fears that this would be 
one-way move from the new CEEC members to the West. For instance, in 
earlier plans for increasing the intra-European research mobility, under the 
Marie Curie fellowship project of the EU Research Framework 5(FP 5) in 
2002, 14 per cent of fellow holders moved from the then candidate Eastern 
European countries to the West and only 0.5 per cent of these fellowships 
receivers moved in the opposite direction. One remedy suggested for having 
more fellows moving to the East would be to make known the Eastern 
universities and research institutes for motivating more scientists to move 
from the West (Ruschkowski 2002). 
 
In spite of all this, global estimates show that countries experiencing 
substantial emigration do not actually loose many of their highly educated 
people to other countries. Out of the 20 countries for which emigration data 
to the US exist, 14 of them loose less than 10 per cent of their highly 
educated (with tertiary education) persons. The situation for the OECD is 
not very different; only in 5 of the 13 labour exporting countries to this 
region loose more than 10 per cent of their highly educated people (Adams, 
Jr, 2003).  
 
4. Home Country Evidence on Brain Drain and its Impact on the Economy: 
The cases of Albania, Bulgaria and Greece 
 
A ten country survey in 1997 for the CEEC region, directed by Gerold (1997), 
has shown that the initial fears of brain drain to the West were not real, the 
actual outflow being less than expected and that EU programmes supporting 
science in home countries generate the potentials for further curtailing 
brain drain from these countries. Investigating future prospects, the survey 
has revealed that the number of “determined emigrants”, i.e. those who 
take some steps to emigrate as opposed to “undetermined emigrants”, i.e. 
those who like to emigrate under “concrete conditions” is very small for all 
CEEC. In Bulgaria, the proportion of scientists interviewed that belong to 
the determined group was 2.3 per cent and for the rest of CEEC a little over 
3 per cent, while for the Baltic countries the proportion was 1-1.5 per cent. 
For Czech Republic and Hungary is a little higher (3 per cent and 4.4 per 
cent respectively). These findings show a different tendency among CEEC 
scientists to emigrate. For instance, the highly educated Bulgarians are less 
inclined than the lower educated to leave their country. 
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For both Albania and Bulgaria, one may distinguish two opposing views 
regarding the volume and the relative size of brain drain, particularly from 
Bulgaria, and two extreme evaluations and one intermediate concerning the 
seriousness of the brain drain impact on the two countries in question. 
 
Two large sample surveys for Bulgaria four years apart (1989 and 1993) on 
the intentions of scientists to emigrate have shown a slight increase in the 
proportion that wanted to emigrate, from 10 per cent to 12 per cent. These 
intentions were strongly affected by the lack of hope that things will change 
fast in Bulgaria and the low salaries for scientists. The expressed preferred 
destination of these potential emigrants was the USA (Chompalov, 2000). 
According to Bobeva of the Bulgarian Central Bank, 67 per cent of Bulgarian 
scientists “were inclined” to emigrate, while 6 per cent of them already had 
contracts with Universities and research institutes. Twenty eight per cent 
had a preference for the USA, 9.9 per cent Canada, 16.2 per cent Germany, 
5.7 per cent Great Britain and 2.4 percent France and Austria (Bobeva, 
1996, cited in Sretenova, 2003). 
 
At present, about 900,000 people, representing 25 per cent of the total 
Albanian population and over 35 per cent percent of the Albanian labour 
force have emigrated. Of them, 600,000 are in Greece, 200,000 in Italy and 
the rest 100,000 in Western Europe, USA and Canada (Barjarba, 2004: 232). 
One million Bulgarians have emigrated since 1989 to the present time, of 
which 85 per cent under the age of 30, and more want to go. 
 
The Bulgarian National Statistical Institute estimates a gross out migration 
of about 747,000, during the period 1989 -1998, and a gross inflow to 
Bulgaria of 277,000, of which more than 80 per cent came after 1993. It is 
estimated that between 1993 and 1998, net immigration of foreign nationals 
to Bulgaria was 43,000. But afterwards, net migration was practically zero, 
small outflows and inflows from other countries compensating each other 
out. In 1990-92, 40,000 highly qualified Bulgarians were working in 
Germany, Ireland, France, UK, and other countries in the west (Straubhaar, 
2000). 
 
During the first years (1989-1992) of transition, 500,000 Bulgarians have 
emigrated, of which 345,000 of Turkish origin moved to Turkey. Bulgaria 
was loosing 45,000-50,000 and more persons every year since 1992. 
Improved 2001 census data gave a population decrease of 258,373 persons 
since 1992, while the Bulgarian population decreased by 10 per cent, 
between 1990 and 2003, to this contributing the elimination of restrictions 
to the free movement (Sretenova, 2003). 
 
Of all CEEC, Bulgaria had in 1997 by far the highest proportion of workers 
with tertiary education in its labour force (19.3 per cent compared with 
10.7-14 per cent for the others) and by far the lowest GDP per capita (PPS $ 
5,100 compared with 6,757-13,530 PPS $ for the other CEEC, in 
1996).(Sretenova, 2003). Later on, in 2000, the proportion of higher 
education workers was raised to 21.2 per cent of the labour force. 
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At the same time, Bulgaria has the highest unemployment of persons with 
tertiary education compared to the rest of CEEC. Out of the total number of 
unemployed, 17 per cent were, in 1997, higher education degree holders 
(Bobeva, 1997 cited in Gerold). The unemployment proportion of higher 
educated persons is quoted in 2000 as 8.8 per cent of the unemployed 
(Beleva and Kotzeva, 2001: 23, cited in Sretenova, 2003). Despite this very 
large proportion of the labour force with tertiary education in late 1990’s, 
and the difficulty of employing them, emigration of highly qualified persons 
has been considered by some writers minimal. That being the case, it was 
suggested that Bulgaria was not deprived of any development potential as a 
result of emigration (Straubhaar, 2000). 
 
Out of the outflow of persons from the Bulgarian science institutions, 11.5 
per cent emigrated during the period 1989-1995 of which more than 87 per 
cent were engaged in research (Gerold, 1997). A 1992 statement by the 
Bulgarian Minister of Science and Higher Education, that 12,000 scientists 
emigrated in the years 1990 and 1991, has been considered as an 
exaggeration, given that only 30, 000 persons had at the time scientific 
degrees or held scientific tenure (Chompalov, 2000).(Table 2). The table 
shows the changes in the number of academics over time in the 1980’s and 
1990’s. 
 
Table 2. Changes in the number of academics by academic degree in 
Bulgaria 
 
Year                                                Number 
                                  PhD              MA              Other            Total  
1985                         1,016            9,616           16,259          26,891 
1990                         1,316          10,528           19,810          31,704 
1995                         1,326          10,112           13,410          24,848 
1999                         1,692          10,190           12,024          23,906 
2000                         1,566          10,214           11,035          22,815 
Change       
1985-90                       350              912             3,551            4,813 
1990-95                      - 40             -416            -6,400          - 6,856 
1995-99                       366               78            -1,386              -942 
1985-99                       676             574            -4,235           -2,985 
Percent change        
1985-90                      34.4             9.5               21.8              17.9 
1990-95                      -2.9            -4.0              -32.3             -21.6 
1995-99                      27.6             0.8              -10.3              -3.8 
1985-99                      66.5             6.0              -26.0            -11.1 
 
Data source: Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria. (Taken 
from Gachter,2002) 
Concerning the composition of the emigrated scientists, it has been 
observed that they were from disciplines of high prestige that had contacts 
with counterparts abroad during their work at home. Thus, of the Bulgarian 
scientists that emigrated, most were in chemistry, biology, medicine and 
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physics (ibid.), drawn mostly from research and development jobs. The 
emigration of physicians was not significant. Their proportion per million of 
working age population remained rather stable during the period 1990-1996. 
In contrast, the 9,000 scientists and engineers in research and development 
in 1990 per million people of working age population (amounting to 50,585 
in 1988/89, according to the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 2001),.dropped 
to 2,200 by 1994 (Gachter, 2002), or to 2,594 in 1996 (Sretenova, 2003). It 
should be noted that both the number of Bulgarian scientists and engineers 
and the number of physicians in relation to population are of the highest in 
CEEC. (Gachter, 2002). 
 
A considerable number of Bulgarian scientists move to the West through 
research fellowships and other incentives offered by various foreign 
institutions, such as British Council, Fulbright, SOROS Foundation, etc, 
located in Bulgaria. It is noted, that by 2003, only in Germany were studying 
7,000 Bulgarians and in Austria 4,000, not to mention USA or UK and other 
Western European countries, and the guess is that “most of them will not 
return” (Sretenova, 2003: 17). 
 
The potential return of highly educated migrants to the home countries 
looks indeed gloomy. From the experts and students who study in Italy, 
Greece, Canada and Germany, only an estimated 5 per cent will return 
(Horvat, 2004), while 63 per cent of those working were planning to state 
there for good. Also, another 63 per cent of mostly young scientists working 
in Albania “plan to leave the country for a long time or forever”. (Barjarba, 
2004; Horvat, 2004). 
 
A quick glance at the domestic enrolments in tertiary education in these 
two countries, as emigration was in progress is in order in this context. One 
can observe two opposite tendencies. In Albania, the gross enrollment ratio 
(enrollments/ number of persons of tertiary education age) is gradually 
increasing from 14 per cent to 16 per cent, during the period 1988-2003. 
The number of students enrolling in tertiary education has doubled in 
Albania in seven years: from 21,645 in 1990 increased to 40,125 in 1997, 
with no change in the subsequent three years. The corresponding ratio for 
Bulgaria, already much higher than in Albania, is dropping from 43 per cent 
to 39 per cent. Naturally, there are many reasons that these ratios may 
move one way or the other to be able to hint anything concrete about the 
brain drain induced brain gain, discussed in the previous section. 
 
Institutional attractiveness is a crucial factor keeping scientists from 
emigrating (Casey et al 2000). There are some hopes expressed for Albania 
that the improvement of their universities and research institutions would 
motivate their emigrated scientists to return after some time abroad. These 
potential returnees would carry with them the human capital acquired 
during their absence, which will make them produce better brain gains from 
what they might have contributed had they not emigrated. This notion is 
based on the alleged experience of other countries indicating that about 
half of students and scientists return (Tafaj, no date). For Bulgaria, 
Chompalov emphasises the “importance to preserve the creative research 
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and development manpower potential, [otherwise there would be] tragic 
long-term consequence for the country”.  
 
Turning to the “brain waste” referred to in the earlier section, there is the 
notion that the brain drain from Albania does not become a brain gain for 
the receiving countries, but rather a brain waste, considering that a high 
proportion of these people work in jobs for which they are overeducated. 
Specifically, in this situation are found 74 per cent of the educated 
Albanians in Greece, 67 per cent in Italy, 58 per cent in Austria and 70 per 
cent in the US (Barjarba, 2004). Eastern European highly qualified migrants 
in the US work in any kind of jobs, as for instance as taxi drivers for which 
are naturally overqualified (Schiff, 2006)  
Concerning in particular the highly educated Albanian and Bulgarian 
immigrants in Greece, some recent findings show in fact a brain waste. A 
microsurvey in Greece found that 34 per cent of the 153 interviewed 
Bulgarian immigrants, the bulk of which were female employed mostly in 
housing, had partial or full higher education (Sarris and Markova, 2001, 
p.171). Another survey, contacted in 1998 in Albania, interviewed 1,500 
individuals who have returned to the country from their previous migration 
in Greece. About half of these people “had some experience of either higher 
education or vocational training” (Kule et al, 2002:232). And yet, for the 
jobs they exercised in Greece, hired male immigrants were overeducated by 
more than 50 per cent and hired female immigrants twice as overeducated, 
compared to their Greek counterparts who are also overeducated for some 
jobs (Glytsos, 2005:834) (Table 3). 
Table 3. Hired Immigrants and Greeks with Higher Education, in lower 
quality jobs (overeducated workers as a percentage of total hires), 2000 
Gender                               Immigrants                            Greeks  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Both genders                             66.1                                    37.0 
Males                                        63.1                                    42.3 
Females                                    67.9                                    32.4 
Source: Glytsos, 2005. (Adapted from Lianos (2003) 
An opposite view on this is proposed by Bobeva, who claims that only 13 per 
cent of emigrated Bulgarians scientists that left research institutions do jobs 
for which they are overqualified. This points, according to her, to the 
phenomenon of the brain drain indeed, given that the bulk of these migrants 
are engaged in scientific work in the host country. Meanwhile, only 11 per 
cent of the emigrated scientists returned. In counterpart, Bulgaria, as other 
CEEC in transition, has received highly skilled workers from other countries 
“farther east and farther west” (Gächter, 2002). 
 
The significance of the brain drain effects on the economy and society are 
hotly debated in both Albania and Bulgaria. It appears however that no 
serious empirical studies exist to substantiate the impact of brain drain on 
the home developing countries in general. This is mainly attributed by some 
to the ‘lack of harmonized international data” by country and educational 
level (Beine et al, 2003). This notwithstanding, one can find generally, as 
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noted above, two extreme views and one intermediate, proposed by 
researchers on the seriousness of brain drain. At one extreme, Albanian and 
Bulgarian researchers consider brain drain from either country as very 
serious, putting the economic future and education and research of these 
countries in jeopardy (see for Albania, Tafaj, no date; and for Bulgaria, 
Chompalov, 2000).  
 
Tafaj maintains that the problem of brain drain should be made “a burning 
issue of Albanian society”, but in fact no attention is paid to it by the 
authorities and political institutions. He evokes the Albanian Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 2000), to point out that during the period 1990-
1999, about 40 per cent of the scientists of universities and research 
institutions have emigrated, a proportion raised to 45 per cent for the 
period 1990-2003, while 67 per cent of those receiving Ph.D’s in the west 
also emigrate. Similar evaluations are also made by others for Albania, 
claiming that Albania “is currently undergoing a potentially devastating 
brain drain. Around a sixth of the population—including roughly a third of 
the country's Intelligentsia—was seeking work outside the country in 2001 
(Tomiuc, 2001, cited in Horvat, 2004)”. 
 
Earlier calculations by some Bulgarian authors predicted that, by 2007, 74 
per cent of the professors and 24 per cent of the associated professors will 
have to retire, while by 2012, correspondingly 89 per cent and 52 per cent 
of these scientists would have to do so. This implies, as the argument goes, 
that it is urgent to motivate Bulgarian scientists to return from abroad and 
others to discourage leaving, otherwise Universities would have serious 
problems of recruiting high level teaching staff (Velev, 2002:4, cited in 
Sretenova, 2003). This may have very serious implications on the quality of 
higher education with further negative effects on the society at large. 
Others maintain that “a weak educational system today will produce a weak 
social elite who will be responsible for guiding the new postcommunist 
society in the next decade [with gloomy] prospects for creating an effective 
and responsive social and political order” (Tascu, Noftsinger, Bowers 2002: 
226, cited in Horvat, 2004).  
 
According to this extremely pessimistic view, “the negative impact worsens 
exponentially each year” (IOM 1997), considering that out of the estimated 
annual emigration of 50,000 from Bulgaria (Economist, 2003), approximately 
20 per cent are highly educated. The official view expressed by Bulgarian 
governments since 1997 is that the emigration of highly qualified persons 
would deter economic and social developments, particularly the promotion 
of the knowledge based society (Sretenova, 2003). 
 
Concern is expressed that this drain of highly qualified persons would have 
not only economic but also political and social implications. Highest state 
officials are afraid that “the absence of discerning and educated voters [due 
to brain drain] poses a serious threat to democracy and the electoral 
process” (Horvat, 2004). As in the case of Albania, some writers worry that 
the future democratic development in Bulgaria would be hindered by the 
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lack of creative research that the mass emigration of the highly skilled 
deprives Bulgaria (Chompalov, 2000). 
The other extreme, expressed mostly by outsiders of these countries, claims 
that “there are no negative effects of highly skilled emigration and that it 
should not be cause for concern” (Horvat, 2004). There is in fact the notion 
that what is negative is the lack of “any benefits from this form of 
emigration” (Sretenova 2003), while “for the moment, the only possible 
benefits from the drain are the growing remittances” (Horvat, 2004), which 
in 2003 amounted to $780 million (Barjarba, 2004). In the same spirit, 
Professor Kristen Ghodsee at the Bowdoin College in Maine, researching the 
Bulgarian situation for more than a decade, claims that “Bulgaria’s case has 
not been one of ‘brain drain’ (the Washington Times, December 27, 2004).  
This negative view is also shared by others. Gachter (2002) maintains that 
the claim that Bulgaria has suffered from brain drain does not seem to be 
valid, since evidence shows that MA and Ph.D holders of all fields of science 
have stayed home. A 1996 study found that out of the 6,005 scientists that 
lost their jobs between 1989 and 1996 and almost the same number during 
the period 1993-2001, by official data, only 600 emigrated (Beleva/Kotzeva 
2001, cited by Gächter, 2002; Sretenova, 2003:20). The run observed from 
the Bulgarian academic system turned mostly to other occupations or to 
retirement and less to emigration (Gachter, 2002). The bottom line of 
Gachter’s analysis is that there has been only “a trickle of highly qualified 
emigrants [that] even cumulatively it is not big enough to make any 
difference at all”. Gachter attributes the low brain drain partly to a lack of 
demand for Bulgarian scientists abroad. 
 
More refined empirical analysis, occupying an intermediate position, shows 
a positive impact of brain drain on the level of education (Beine, Docquier 
and Rapoport, 2003), a negative impact for small brain drain cases (Lucas, 
2005) and no impact on growth (Faini, 2005) [all cited in Ozden, 2006]. In 
this context, Davies (2003:17) claims that per capita growth is not positively 
affected by human capital, while several other studies find the contrary. 
Some question the causality between growth and education, arguing that 
expected growth affects education rather than the other way around (Bils 
and Klenow 2000) [cited in Lucas, 2004]. Perhaps in the same league belongs 
the view that predicts only a long term negative impact and does not 
recognize the significance of remittances as a counterbalancing benefit, 
claiming that they “do not have strategic value for the country” (Horvat, 
2004).  
Greece has been experiencing considerable brain drain in the post second 
world war period to North America and Western Europe, and is recently 
experiencing an intake of highly educated persons from CEEC. (ELKE- 
Hellenic Center for Investment, 2004). Although data on the exodus of 
highly qualified people from Greece is scant, one should seriously consider a 
recent government press report (Ministry of Development, 19.8.2005), 
stating that over 60,000 Greek students study in foreign universities. 
According to the UNESCO Statistics, the figure was in 2002/2003, 50,252, of 
which 43,047 were distributed in five major countries of study (United 
Kingdom 22,485; Italy 7,979; Germany 7,798; France 2,444 and US 2,341). 
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According to the British Council in Greece, in 2003, 24,275 Greeks were 
studying in British Universities, of which 13,180 in post-graduate studies. It 
is very interesting that huge China comes second with 17,682 students in 
Britain (Naftemboriki, 29.8.2005). 
Precise figures of those that stay after finishing their studies to work in 
these countries do not exist, but it is well known that a considerable 
number, particularly of those with post-graduate degrees, do not return, 
especially from the US and the United Kingdom, but from France too. 
Against this situation, some “romantic” official, but also unofficial 
“dramatic” flashes of interest emerge, from time to time, in political and 
scientific circles and loud voices are heard on the benefits that the 
repatriation of the Greek scientists would bring to the country. 
Unfortunately, no practical effective policies accompany this wishful 
thinking for motivating the return of the educated Greeks from abroad. But 
apart from this, neither any preceding official documentation nor any 
serious research has supported the view that the absence of this part of 
highly qualified people could harm or deter Greece’s economic growth or 
hold back its research activity in the low level that it is, irrespective of the 
brain drain.  
Yet, very recently, something seems to be moving, at least at the search 
and organisational level. A Committee of Professors was set up to elaborate 
a new institutional framework of research in general and for attracting 
Greek scientists from abroad to return to the country, in particular. The 
Committee has suggested that “the call of new researchers from the 
reservoir of the drained manpower of diaspora must be one of the top 
national priorities for Development and Education. Otherwise,    in view of 
the increasing leakages abroad, the [Greek] Universities will soon have only 
a small high quality scientific and research staff” (Report by the Committee 
for the Institutional Framework of Research in Greece, 28.6.2005). 
In general, brain drain from Greece generates brain gains in the receiving 
countries, since the educated emigrants work mostly in occupations worthy 
of their qualifications in the US, Canada and Europe. In contrast, as we have 
previously shown, educated people coming recently to Greece from CEEC do 
not seem to generate brain gains for Greece since they work mostly in jobs 
for which they are overqualified. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite the theoretical debate of the multi-directional effects of the brain 
drain in the economy and society of the home country, the empirical 
research is limited with contradictory and confusing results. In fact, 
inferences are often made from casual observations without any convincing 
elementary analysis. This is the result either of passionate concern about 
the potential risks that are in store for the future developments of the 
countries in transition, or because an appropriate methodology has not been 
developed, or even because suitable data for serious analysis are lacking. 
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The consequence of these inadequacies is the partial ad hoc and superficial 
practical consideration of the issues referred to brain drain, providing 
ambivalent lines of thought, which formulate attitudes that often imply 
inappropriate, futile or ineffective policies. Measures for merely hindering 
the emigration of educated people or efforts to motivate their return 
cannot by themselves alone, without a friendly comprehensive institutional 
and pragmatic framework, promote development and growth, and elevate 
education and research to higher quality levels. 
The discussion on the brain drain from Albania and Bulgaria, but even 
Greece - with a long history of emigration of highly qualified persons - has 
not escaped the stereotype way of thinking that had emigration of educated 
persons not taken place, the economy and society would have been much 
better. Such considerations ignore the high and chronic unemployment of 
educated persons or their employment in jobs for which they are very often 
overqualified. Apart from the waste of expensive human capital that this 
situation entails, the dramatic turn of these people from the precarious 
state of underemployment to a degrading state of redundancy, to which the 
educated workers in several of Eastern European economies in transition are 
subjected, adds to the difficulties that these people are facing. Thus, any 
efforts to motivate return are complex and should be dealt with 
simultaneously at the organisational and the practical level, after thorough 
investigation and research at all fronts of economic, social, educational and 
political aspects. 
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